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Abstract
Money laundering has ascended the enforcement and criminological agenda in the course
of this century, and has been accompanied by an increased focus on legal professionals as
‘enablers’ of crime. This article explores the dynamics of this enforcement, media and
political agenda, and how the legal profession has responded in the UK and elsewhere,
within the context of ignoring the difficulties of judging the effectiveness of anti money
laundering. It concludes that legal responses are a function of their lobbying power, the
determination of governments to clamp down on the toxic impacts of legal structures, and
different legal cultures. However, it remains unclear what the effects on the levels and
organization of serious crimes for gain are of controls on the professions.
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Introduction
Why should we be interested analytically in the financial flows and in the professionals
and financiers connected with organized crime? There has been intermittent interest
since the 1960s and indeed, even centuries earlier, in the “depth of field” of organized
crime. ‘The fence’ has been an enduring factual and fictional theme for centuries, for
example in Dickens’ Oliver Twist, and it is sometimes said that without receivers of
stolen goods, there would be less crime.1 Yet receivers and the conceptual Stolen
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1It is also the case without clients for illicit goods, there will be less crime. There have been Jews (including
ultra-Orthodox Jews) involved in money laundering, but (perhaps partly because of its newness in
criminalisation), money laundering has not been a central trope in the anti-Semitism that has been present for
centuries in portrayals of Jewish bankers and moneylenders (or Dickens’ Fagin/Shakespeare’s Shylock).
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Property System have attracted relatively little interest from criminologists or from
strategic policing (for exceptions, see e.g. Chappell and Walsh 1973; Langworthy
1989; Mack 1972; Mack and Kerner 1975; Sutton 2014).
Money laundering has been increasingly mainstreamed in this century as a key
component of major crimes for gain: Trends in Organized Crime itself has published
500 articles containing money laundering as a key word, beginning in 1995 when the
journal began. As of mid-October 2020, Google Ngram shows the rising trend in
anglophone books containing the phrases ‘money laundering’ and 'organized
crime' over the last century (1920-end 2019) thus:
So there appears to be a growingmarket for (or at least supply of) money laundering texts!
Yet despite the immense institutional success of the Financial Action Task Force and the EU
in expanding their mandate and legislating the world (Halliday et al. 2020), contemporary
investigative journalism is full of examples of ‘under-investigated’ and ‘under-prosecuted’
money laundering rings. As I write, the latest of these is the ‘FinCEN leaks’ which, after a
lengthy gestation while some of the financial links were analyzed in the now familiar way
across continents, was trailed apocalyptically on September 20, 2020 by the leak’s recipient
BuzzFeed as follows (https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jasonleopold/fincen-files-
financial-scandal-criminal-networks):
The FinCEN Files investigation shows that even after they were prosecuted or
fined for financial misconduct, banks such as JPMorgan Chase, HSBC, Standard
Chartered, Deutsche Bank, and Bank of New York Mellon continued to move
money for suspected criminals.
Suspicious payments flow around the world and into countless industries,
from international sports to Hollywood entertainment to luxury real estate to
Nobu sushi restaurants. They filter into the companies that make familiar
items from people’s lives, from the gas in their car to the granola in their
cereal bowl.
The FinCEN Files expose an underlying truth of the modern era: The networks
through which dirty money traverse the world have become vital arteries of the
global economy. They enable a shadow financial system so wide-ranging and so
unchecked that it has become inextricable from the so-called legitimate economy.
Banks with household names have helped to make it so.
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The international media focus subsequent to these revelations tended to focus on the
banks’ ongoing willingness to act for clients they had made reports on, rather than on
the lack of public investment in following up the reports they had made, freezing the
alleged crime proceeds and prosecuting or taking other action against suspects. One
reason for this may be that the inaction of private institutions such as bankers and
professionals makes an attractive target for ‘folk devilment’, especially if there is
official corruption to complement it. In parallel, alongside a journalistic undercover
operation, Al Jazeera was able to shine a light on the Golden Passports scandal in
Cyprus, offering Cyprus and therefore EU citizenship for a substantial fee to some less
than impeccable non-Europeans, with senior officials allegedly ‘on the take’ and some
senior political resignations in the aftermath of publicity2; Malta has some very similar
publicized issues,3 but many other EU countries differ from Cyprus and Malta only as a
matter of degree (which is not unimportant): they are less blatant in offering EU-wide
passports without much due diligence (Global Witness 2020). The net effect of these
revelations in 2020 might be to sharpen the questions about what are the benefits of
Anti-Money Laundering (AML) controls and upon whom and what the controls bite
(and do not bite) in different parts of the world.4
Organized crime as a target of AML
The regular critiques do not lead properly to the conclusion that money laundering
controls have no effect, but there is little research that shows how or to what extent they
impact on what crimes and what forms of criminal organization. Organized crime
scholars over the past decade have become interested in the ‘scripts’ of organized crime
and in the ways in which crimes are organized and shaped by controls: markets vary in
the extent to which we know about their extent and shape, however, and given the
alleged trillions of dollars involved in money laundering, a valid question is how much
of that huge criminal space is well described and understood? Organized crime and
money laundering have been put together in a model first developed by the US
Presidential (Reagan) Commission on organized crime which reported in 1986. This
saw a focus on the money trail as one of the key routes through which its particular
forms of organized crime could be combated.5
2 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/10/15/cyprus-house-speaker-resigns-following-al-jazeera-
investigation; https://timesofmalta.com/articles/view/eu-to-launch-legal-action-over-cyprus-malta-golden-
passports.825802.
3 Even including the alleged involvement of the then Prime Minister (who had to resign) and his (arrested)
chief of staff in covering up the networks involved in the killing of the investigative journalist Daphne Caruana
Galizia (‘Malta Murder Investigation Closes In on ‘Mafia State”
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/19/world/europe/malta-murder-daphne-caruana-galizia.html?action=
click&module=RelatedLinks&pgtype=Article; https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2020/oct/
15/justice-on-trial-three-years-after-murder-daphne-caruana-galizia.
4 Increasingly, we have authoritarian regimes using banks’ obligations to report ‘suspicions’ of crime and
terrorism to require them to divulge financial transfers by political opponents of the regime - e.g. ‘Banks in
Hong Kong advised to report security law breaches to police’ https://www.ft.com/content/4f52cb9c-b069-
4b6c-9ef6-f980946f6eb3, 20 October 2020 – or to ‘de-risk’ them as clients. One technique of control is to
require foreign institutions and charities to register and be monitored more intensively.
5 See Jacobs (2020) for a recent – almost triumphalist - review of this conventional conception of organized
crime in the US.
Trends in Organized Crime
‘If money laundering is the keystone of organized crime, these recommendations
can provide the financial community and law enforcement authorities with the
tools needed to dislodge that keystone, and thereby to cause irreparable damage
to the operations of organized crime’.
The Cash Connection, US Presidential Commission on Organized Crime (1986:
63)
This model focusing on the goal of integration or legitimization of the proceeds of
crime contains a paradox. If the crime syndicates are planning to finance future crimes,
they are definitely not thereby legitimizing the proceeds of past crimes: rather the
reverse, since they are both laundering (in the formal legal if not in the analytical sense
of cleansing) and intending to commit whatever new predicate crime they are planning.
This is highlighted to stress an important ambiguity: on the one hand, the dominant
cultural image of ‘laundering’ among national, Inter-Governmental Organizations
(IMF, World Bank and UN) and Non-Governmental Organizations is indeed the use
of sophisticated methods to cleanse ‘dirty money’ (from an ever-increasing range of
predicate offences, latterly including foreign bribery and both domestic and foreign tax
evasion); but on the other, the offence of laundering applies in most jurisdictions to
whatever anyone does to hide, transfer or transform the proceeds of any crime, whether
or not this actually legitimizes the funds or is intended to do so. Some proceeds are
moved around to conceal their illegitimate origins in such a way as to defeat a
significant financial investigation by competent professionals (though because of
resource constraints combined with secrecy havens, this is not likely to happen in
practice in many cases). But others are merely simple (self) laundering into accounts in
their own or friends’ names, to fund possible future crimes as well as lifestyle
expenditures and savings rather than as precursors to integration into the mainstream
economy.6 Thus, one finds many newspaper reports stating that people have been
charged both with drugs trafficking and with money laundering if the police have found
a large bundle of cash hidden behind a false wall in their home or buried in the garden
or even concealed in their cars.7
Many launderers fall in between these extremes. Once he (normally a male)
generates a volume of business too large to spend immediately and/or to store phys-
ically in a place he considers safe (including a bank account or real estate which may be
in the name of others), the drug dealer or other illicit trader will need someone with
other skills to launder the revenues, at least on an intermittent if not regular basis if he
intends to continue a life of crime. Both will be guilty of money laundering. Though
convictions for corrupt financial insiders are rare – as they are also for ‘insiders’ in
cybercrimes (Williams et al. 2019) - there can be three parties: the money launderer
could be an intermediary who recruits someone inside a financial institution to make
the transaction and/or open accounts to facilitate transactions (knowingly or with
willful blindness or even naively), or a set of ‘money mules’ with existing accounts
6 Some countries struggle more than others with this criminalisation process, which is usually done as a
reaction to or in anticipation of an evaluation by the Financial Action Task Force of one of its regional
groupings. The Netherlands, for example, has shifted its legal position on self-laundering on several occasions.
7 E.g. https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3307285/Magistrate-58-jailed-burying-270-000-drug-dealer-
son-law-s-ill-gotten-gains-garden.html; https://www.independent.ie/irish-news/courts/home-with-bulletproof-
windows-sauna-and-72k-buried-in-garden-proceeds-of-crime-high-court-rules-37724357.html.
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recruited (sometimes believing it is a genuine job) to put the crime proceeds through for
onward transmission. Nor is it always the case that it is the ‘organized criminal’ who
makes the approach to the insider. It can be an insider who is rapacious and seeks out
offenders for whom to launder money whether he has always done this or is responding
freshly to financial or other pressures. This corresponds to distinction between ‘grass
eaters’ and ‘meat eaters’ made by the Knapp Commission (1972) on New York police
corruption: grass eaters are those who passively receive bribes, and meat eaters are
those who proactively go in search of bribes.
However, there is a constraint which results from an enforcement and regulatory
focus: especially if they are going to launder money regularly, insiders within financial
institutions need to neutralize internal vigilance by Compliance and/or Money Laun-
dering Reporting Officers, who in theory could go to jail as well as receive large
corporate fines for having inadequate money laundering controls. So despite the
understandable cynicism when we observe big money sums in corporate sanctions
for large-scale laundering, it would be very surprising if internal controls never had any
effects in situational laundering prevention. Whistleblower accounts and criminal cases
tell us only about the ‘failures’ to do so (or rather, intentional decisions to bypass
controls), often involving kleptocrats and intermediaries in high level corruption, but
also involving drug dealers and human traffickers. In the 1MDB case in which the then
Prime Minister of Malaysia Najib Razak has been given a 12 year prison sentence in
2020 for funneling part of billions stolen from the country, senior executives at
Goldman Sachs found ways to hide the involvement of wealthy entrepreneur Jho
Low, by-passing the strong objections of Goldman’s compliance officers, who sought
to stop him becoming a private wealth client (Noonan 2020). In that case, as in
Deutsche Bank compliance efforts to reduce the bank’s dealings with Donald Trump
pre-Presidency (Enrich 2020), the efforts failed. However, in some (we have no idea
what proportion of) others, they have succeeded in reducing particular crimes (though
not necessarily in reducing ‘crime’ overall). In 2017, HSBC staff became suspicious
about the proposed transfer of $500 million by the son of the former President of
Angola, reported it to the authorities, and blocked the account. The filing of the
suspicious activity report led to an international investigation, the return of the funds,
and the imprisonment of the son8 (and following ‘Luanda Leaks’, action against his
sister Isobel dos Santos, Africa’s richest woman, including freezing all her accounts):
though see Engebretsen and de Oliveira (2020).
In the long period since the first US criminalization measures in 1986, one might
have expected a strong evidence base on what happens to proceeds of crime. That is far
from being the case. Indeed governments and intergovernmental organizations have
spent almost nothing on public research on these issues, while regular costly (pre-
Covid-19) international meetings service the global fight against this ill-understood
phenomenon and to ‘evaluate’ these efforts. (These evaluations are mainly procedurally
to date, though this is slowly changing to ‘real world’ assessment, at least in principle -
see Levi et al. 2018; Ferwerda and Reuter 2019). Meanwhile, especially this century,
what many governments include in the category of ‘financial crime’ expands ever
wider: for example, it is difficult to evade taxes without also being a money launderer,
8 https://www.complianceweek.com/opinion/hat-tip-to-hsbc-for-stopping-money-laundering-saving-lives/
29324.article.
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though very few are prosecuted unless they are political opponents of authoritarian
governments. In this morass of perpetual control activity, it may not be surprising that
there is no coherent ‘theory of change’ that explains and/or predicts what levels of
financial investigation and asset recovery will have on the volume or forms of
laundered money, nor on the separate question of how these interventions will impact
on criminal markets under which circumstances. Instead of serious empirical work
(whose absence is strongly critiqued by academics from Naylor 1999 to Van Duyne
et al. 2019), there is a compelling cross-cultural narrative of ‘follow the money’
established initially by the use of tax evasion charges to jail Al Capone9 that has
become a law enforcement mantra since the mid-1980s (Halliday et al. 2020).
The evidence on where the money goes and most recently also where the money
comes from (Levi 2015) has been seen as a route into answering the question of how
concentrated organized crime is, how transnational it is, how ‘complicated’ it is (though
by what criteria remain unexplicated) and whether there is any evidence to support the
common view developed in the US to fit the drugs market and recycled endlessly ever
since, that money laundering always goes through the three stages of placement,
layering and integration. The integration concept is nicely captured in the themes of
The Godfather but is also reflected in an earlier era in the analysis by Bell (1953) that
organized crime represents a ‘queer ladder of social mobility’ in America. In most
cases, and not disregarding the important point about organized criminals in the UK
(and likely elsewhere) seeking local or at most regional rather than national or global
control (Campana and Varese 2018), how much appetite is there among most laun-
derers or organized criminals in OECD countries to attain political control or to become
titans of finance and industry?
The anti-money laundering transnational legal order has been developing rapidly in
recent years to incorporate all crimes great and small, and one of the difficulties for this
paper (and for the more substantial review by Levi and Soudijn 2020) is how to
differentiate the laundering of organized crime funds from other sources of criminal
income, which include tax evasion, grand corruption and the financing of terrorism -
which can sometimes involve committing ‘organized crime’ offences. For example, it
is hard to maintain that the funneling of billions allegedly stolen in the Malaysian
1MDB scandal was not well organized. It is simply that the principal people involved –
including the then Malaysian Prime Minister and his entourage, Goldman Sachs and
many intermediaries - would not be viewed by many respectable elites or by the police
as ‘organized crime actors’. We might extend this boundary problem to the deliberate
falsification of data to regulators e.g. ‘diesel-gate’ emissions, primarily by the
Volkswagen Group, and also by the now defunct Takata of safety data for its world-
wide manufacture of car airbags. Arguably that behavior involved several actors
planning how to commit crimes and get away with them over a long period of time
for the pursuit of profit and power. Yet many people (if not many readers of Trends in
Organized Crime) would balk at the idea of labeling senior executives of major
corporations as organized criminals and of describing their distribution of profits as
organized crime money laundering, though others might complain if we did not so label
9 If only Capone had paid his taxes on his illicit income! It is an open question to what extent contemporary
criminals do declare all their income from crime and pay tax on it – a claim often made but seldom if ever
tested. If they do not declare all their illicit income to the revenue agencies, they have not fully legitimized it.
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them for their intentional deception (see Levi 2019 for a discussion). Other contexts of
elite misconduct are less challenging to our stereotypical differentiation between white-
collar and organized crime: e.g. the investigative media exposure of Operation Laun-
dromat and subsequent scandals shows cross-ties between politicians in the former
Soviet Union, organized criminals, professional crime enablers and bankers in the
Baltic States, and international finance centers including London and New York.
Conventional divisions between white-collar and organized crime are challenged also
by accusations about the conduct of Kazakhstan-based mining company ENRC, which
has been involved in a long running battle with the UK Serious Fraud Office over its
transnational bribery investigation which has so far lasted seven years without a
decision to prosecute or not (Burgis 2020a, b). Many millions of pounds have been spent
on lawyers’ fees in this and similar cases, competently and aggressively defended as is their
legal right. This included allegations that the now retired head of white-collar crime at law
firm Dechert procured and/or used hacked emails and was complicit in torture (or ‘robust
interrogation’) of a former senior lawyer in the UAE, in connection with defending ENRC;
there are allegations that potential witnesses were murdered (Beioley 2020a, b). Dechert was
also accused by ENRC of passing on information to the SFO about the case against ENRC’s
interests, though the Court of Appeal ruled that litigation privilege would apply to documents
shared between ENRC and its then legal advisers, and the SFO could not get access to
external or internal legal documents (SFO v ENRC [2018]EWCA Civ 2006; Kemp Little
2019). So some ‘elite’ corporate cases can be as murky as stereotypical ‘organized crime
cases’, a fact depicted inmovies and contemporary television series about whistleblowers and
launderers, from Chinatown and The China Syndrome onwards.
One useful way of thinking about it is to separate out full-time organized criminals;
organized crime facilitation via otherwise legitimate or semi-licit legal and accounting
professionals; and transport logistics for crime proceeds. How ‘elite’ the facilitators (including
lawyers) of organized crime funds are compared with those that facilitate the proceeds of
GrandCorruption is largely unknown and not explicitly examined. In some countries, there is
a fusion or at least a strong overlap between some politicians and ‘organized crime’ activities
as popularly understood. The involvement of these actors can be analyzed as routine activities
(a) knowingly (b) unknowingly and (c) hard to tell if a or b: but the nature of these ‘markets
for laundering’ and how asymmetric they are is ill understood.
Professional enablers
Much of the white-collar crime literature indicates how difficult it is to ‘folk devil’
corporate elites and professionals, whether intentionally or simply as a by-product of
media coverage or regulatory/criminal justice interventions (e.g. Levi 2009; Lord et al.
2019). It is not clear where and when the first use of this apparently neutral but often
pejoratively used term began. However, a report by the World Economic Forum (2012)
on Organised Crime Enablers contained a section on Money Laundering Enablers.10
The National Crime Agency’s (2014: 1) strategy for tackling ‘High End Money
Laundering’ somewhat bizarrely states: “For the purposes of this strategy, we are
defining “high end” money laundering as the laundering of funds, wittingly or
10 Full disclosure: the author was a member of the report drafting team.
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unwittingly, through the UK financial sector and related professional services.” Though
the document did distinguish crimes that needed to hide an audit trail from street level
crimes, many might have thought that most money laundering met that description of
‘high level’. It plausibly and reasonably added (p.1) that
Although there are many ways to launder money, it is often the professional
enabler who holds the key to the kind of complex processes that can provide the
necessary anonymity for the criminal. Professionals such as lawyers, trust and
company formation agents, investment bankers and accountants are among those
at greatest risk of becoming involved, either wittingly or unwittingly.
Thus, lawyers are generically one set of enablers, and the construct was formalized in
the UK’s Serious Crime Act 2015 which criminalized membership of organized crime
groups, in line with the EU Directive.
In the US, the more common term for enablers is ‘gatekeepers’: readers may judge
for themselves whether this is more or less pejorative as a construct, but the American
Bar Association- which (like the Australians) has successfully resisted national regu-
lation for AML – appears to embrace it. In 2002, two years after the Law Society for
England and Wales created a Money Laundering Task Force, the US created an ABA
Task Force on the Gatekeeper Regulation and the Profession whose principal goal
appeared to be ‘hands off’ (https://www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/
gatekeeper/):
Our Task Force was created…to examine U.S. government and multilateral
efforts to combat international money laundering and the implications of these
efforts for lawyers and the profession. The legal profession, as well as certain
financial sector professions, have been characterized as the "gatekeepers" to the
international financial and business markets.
The mission of the Task Force is to respond to initiatives by the U.S. Department
of Justice and other organizations that will impact on the attorney-client relation-
ship in the context of anti-money laundering enforcement. We are reviewing and
evaluating ABA policies and rules regarding the ability of attorneys to disclose
client activity and information, and developing a position on the Gatekeeper
issue. We are developing educational programs for legal professionals and law
students, and organizing resource materials to allow lawyers to comply with their
anti-money laundering responsibilities. The goal is to preserve the integrity of the
attorney-client relationship.
This is not the place for a detailed legal discussion of how different legal regimes have
responded to demands from the Financial Action Task Force to control their gatekeep-
ing function (see Levi 2020). Suffice it to say that the answers lie in political lobbying
strengths and in different legal cultures struggling against pressures from the Financial
Action Task Force and the European Union, within a context of massive general
ignorance of both money laundering and the role of professionals, which does not
appear to have gripped the public or politicians in the same way that some forms of
street and household crime have. Dealing with kleptocracies has occasionally
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stimulated high level international action plans (e.g. the Cameron Summit of 2016 -
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/anti-corruption-summit-2016-pms-closing-
remarks), and in the UK, the BBC television series (but not the decade earlier book)
McMafia stimulated greater political support for enquiries into Russian money of
questionable provenance and its impact in Britain. In parallel, the proselytizing by
mega-rich former fund manager Bill Browder has led the US, Canada and the UK to
enact Magnitsky sanctions against what they politically deem Human Rights abuses, in
memory of the former lawyer to a hedge fund who was allegedly killed in a Russian
prison at the instigation of the Putin regime, and the Panama Papers and other
campaigns have highlighted the overseas assets of Putin and some other prominent
politicians (Belton 2020). However, bankers and governments rather than lawyers have
been the primary focus of these campaigns. Nevertheless, in October 2020, The
German Koln prosecutors issued international arrest warrants for Jürgen Mossack
and Ramón Fonseca to answer accusations of forming a criminal organization and
complicity in tax evasion in Germany: they are also being sought by the US and are
‘under investigation’ in Panama, which does not extradite its citizens, so they are only
prosecutable if they travel abroad.
Nougayrede (2019) has explicated the different cultural factors underlying lawyer
regulation in France, the UK and the US, to which I would add that in the UK, the
cultural tradition of less legally formalized public-private partnerships has been a strong
feature of the lawyer regime as well as other aspects of anti-money laundering (see also
Vogel and Maillart 2020). American and Australian lawyers have generated a mini-
malist approach to their legal obligations to analyze the riskiness of their clients and to
report to national Financial Intelligence Units any suspicions about their transactions,
while UK lawyers are at the other end of that international spectrum, reporting
suspicions of their clients’ transactions more often than the rest of the EU together,
despite theoretically having the same regulatory obligations. Notwithstanding that,
criticisms of ‘under-reporting’ have continued to be made by senior members of the
UK government, the National Crime Agency and NGOs over the past few years,
leading to complaints by the legal and other professions that they have been unreason-
ably stigmatized (see e.g. Cross 2018; Walters 2016), as they have also been for
actively defending Legal Aid and immigration issues, and as judges have been for
making rulings supportive of Human Rights and critical of some Brexit legislation.
There are multiple ways that this issue can be examined. One is to focus solely on
the legal, organizational and political responses to control. The second is to start with
what we know about lawyer participation in money laundering and crime (what the UK
National Crime Agency (NCA), 2014, refers to as a strategic ‘knowledge gap’) and to
consider how we might fill the gaps with reasonably valid knowledge rather than either
(a) cynical assumptions about lawyer participation or (b) (by some legal professionals)
naïve or faux naïf denials accompanied by demands for proof. Some aspects of the
evidence are dealt with in Levi and Soudijn (2020). For our present purpose in focusing
only on laundering, we should set aside cases of alleged serious lawyer misconduct in
assisting mostly legitimate corporations, because though it may help with an alleged
corrupt or fraud scheme, this is merely a precursor to the laundering phase. A lawyer or
a sophisticated businessperson can probably launder the proceeds of their own crimes
without recourse to a third party ‘enabler’. Someone getting a non-trivial amount of
cash from drugs or other illicit services might spend some of it on having fun, and build
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and/or buy homes for himself and his family – in either his country of origin or locally
– with it. It depends on his or her savings ratio and income from crime. If self-
laundering is not practical, the laundering can be outsourced to so-called professional
money launderers (PMLs) who are contracted by the criminal to solve particular
logistical bottlenecks (Benson 2020, Kleemans et al. 2002; Kruisbergen et al. 2014;
May and Bhardwa 2018). A PML is a necessity if the offenders want to be able to
develop crimes at scale, distinguishable from usually low-skilled and readily substitut-
able ‘front men’ or ‘straw men’, who might be nominees on property deeds or company
documents but who do not plan or execute a laundering scheme.
So the need for enablers depends on the scale and form of the profits from crime, and
the seriousness with which the offenders want to conceal them. The classic nail bar,
sun-tanning or massage parlour may not require an elaborate corporate construction,
though it will require an accountant (who may not need to be a member of a
professional body) and a lawyer for property title and transfers. An international
business normally would require a lawyer/notary, though not necessarily a complicit
one. A 2019 civil confiscation order for £6 million targeted the network around the
winner of millions in the UK National Lottery, where it appeared that this offered a
partial cover for a web of illicit funds from frauds and from Russia, involving a multi-
millionaire businessman, a barrister, and others.11 Once the transactions grew larger
and more frequent, the lottery win should not have disarmed the banks and
professionals, though it apparently did. Middleton and Levi (2005, 2015) examine
cases of British lawyers who launder the proceeds of their own crimes such as fraud,
but also the smaller number identified of those who launder the proceeds of other
people’s crimes, perhaps after mutual attraction through vice and/or blackmail pressure.
Changes in ethical legal culture, financial pressures from deterioration in levels of
business, and the ownership of law firms may increase money laundering opportunities
and ‘needs’ of the firm and/or the individual to launder. Benson (2020) analyzed 20
British cases between 2002 and 2013 in which lawyers or accountants were convicted
of money laundering. The cases varied by the purpose of the transactions, the level of
financial benefit gained by the professional, and the nature of their relationship with the
predicate offender. Whereas acting in the purchase or sale of residential property and
moving money through their firm’s client account were the most common means by
which lawyers in the cases were involved with criminal funds, there were also lawyers
who had: written to a bank to try to get them to unfreeze an account; paid bail for a
11 https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/lottery-winner-hit-with-6m-bill-over-money-laundering-h6sbdc0dl. The
NCA uncovered an international money laundering network that saw hundreds of millions of pounds
transferred through more than 100 bank accounts held globally including in the UK, Russia, Hong Kong,
and Switzerland. The lottery winner’s husband’s activities first came to light during another NCA civil
recovery investigation involving convicted drug smuggler Amir Azam where £4million in assets were
recovered. He structured his wealth so it was in his wife’s name; they rented a London flat in Belgravia
costing £2000 a week. The couple hired a private jet for a foreign trip, holidayed in Cannes and Dubai,
shopped at Harrods and built a swimming pool at their country home. So not all was saved and integrated! See
https://nationalcrimeagency.gov.uk/news/eight-year-nca-investigation-results-in-multi-million-pound-asset-
recovery-including-luxury-hotel-and-100k-bentley (accessed 12 May 2019). In another case, following civil
proceedings and an Unexplained Wealth Order, the unprosecuted head of the 88 M business group gave up to
the NCA 45 properties and four parcels of land in London, Leeds and Cheshire, plus £584,000 in cash that was
the subject of an account freezing order. Some accountants and lawyers who worked with him or his
businesses have been reported to their professional regulators, with outcomes yet unknown. His business
front made it not implausible that the money came from licit activities (The Times, 7 October, 2020).
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client using what was considered to be the proceeds of crime; transferred ownership of
hotels belonging to a client; written a series of profit and loss figures on the back of a
letter; and witnessed an email, allowed the use of headed stationery and provided legal
advice for a mortgage fraudster. Four lawyers were knowingly and intentionally
involved, but in the majority of cases, Benson concluded that there was no evidence
of a deliberate decision to offend or dishonesty on the part of the lawyer (which in my
view did not mean always that there was none, but that none could be proven).
Although such behaviour did not show that the lawyers were part of the ‘crime group’,
their contribution to the goal of the crimes – successful extraction of proceeds – was
important.
An American research study examined 123 case files of defendants who had been
convicted and sentenced in 2009 in the US Second Circuit on federal money laundering
charges (Cummings and Stepnowsky 2011). It noted that 98.4% of convictions were
obtained through a plea, and found that ‘lawyers facilitated money laundering, both
wittingly and unwittingly, in 25 % of the cases examined’. Of the 10 cases pertaining to
lawyers in the final data set of 40 cases, four involved ‘lawyer self-directed schemes’
where the lawyer had committed fraud or embezzlement, and then had laundered his/
her own illicit gains. This left only six cases where lawyers were unwittingly involved
in facilitating money laundering, five of which pertained to real estate transactions.
Cummings and Stepnowsky (2011) concluded that there was no demonstrable evidence
to support government proposals that lawyers act as agents of the government by filing
suspicious activity reports (SARS) with a federal entity, since lawyers who deliberately
launder their own illicit monies will not report suspicious transactions, and any
suspicious reporting regime could only possibly be of value in cases where lawyers
unwittingly facilitate money laundering! (Though if they were truly unwitting, why
would the lawyer have made a SAR? Presumably via education to raise their con-
sciousness.) In that study, only 6 out of 123 cases had lawyers who were unwitting
dupes of money laundering, and more than 80% of these cases concerned real estate
money laundering. But of course, this may do little more than demonstrate that
attorney-client privacy and legal professional privilege make convicting or even pros-
ecuting crooked lawyers too much of a challenge except where they run the scams
themselves and in essence are self-launderers!
Discussion and conclusions
Where offenders and would-be offenders expect lawyers and other professionals to be
what Capone called ‘the legitimate rackets’, a plausible hypothesis is that they will
make requests to assist in laundering more often, especially but by no means only if the
professionals have vices for which they can be blackmailed. Conversely, if criminals
think that lawyers are ethical and/or have nothing to blackmail or pressurise them with,
fewer requests will be made. These positions may be too binary to match the reality
within and between jurisdictions: for example, what are the effects of contraction of
legitimate business on lawyers’ suspiciousness of new business and whether conduct
fits money laundering typologies? Such ‘differential association’ models are difficult to
test, and the data are too weak and anecdotal to enable general inferences to be made.
But there is no reason why the involvement of professionals in money laundering
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should be constant over place and time, and despite the high rhetoric about their
flexibility and globalisation, the ease with which offenders who are not members of
social elite circles can and do use lawyers in less regulated jurisdictions is largely
unexamined, at least publicly. (It fits with the incorrect assertion that offenders who are
frustrated in one jurisdiction can simply move their criminal operations elsewhere.)
Moreover, it is important not to overstate the involvement of legal professionals in all
forms of ‘organised crime’: Antonopoulos et al. (2019) have thrown a light on money
movement in counterfeit goods, which usually requires little lawyer engagement.
Nevertheless, even excluding the misconduct of otherwise legitimate corporations,
many higher level offenders do use corporate and trust vehicles to transfer assets and
money, especially in frauds; and they use lawyers or notaries when purchasing and
selling homes and businesses.
Unlike many areas of transnational organised crime, technologies have played only a
minor role in this account. Hacking (as in the data compromise of professionals’ files at
Mossack Fonseca in the Panama Papers); leaking (as in the FinCEN files); automated
searches for background checks/‘adverse media’ on clients and whether they are on
international lists of sanctioned individuals and corporations; technologies of data
analysis and cross-matching by journalists such as the International Consortium of
Investigative Journalists (all cases) have played their growing part in the defamation-
avoiding exposure of matters normally held within what Van De Bunt (2010) evoca-
tively described as the ‘walls of secrecy and silence’. (See also Morselli and Giguere
2006.) But in the FinCEN and some other whistleblowing exposes, only electronic
funds and corporate vehicles moved, though sometimes clients and professionals giving
legally privileged advice did move as they went physically or electronically around the
globe in search of increased trade in ‘invisible earnings’. Data are not kept on how
many cases lawyers turn down clients or accept deals that (reasonably or not) may be
viewed as legally questionable in retrospect: but journalists for the Organized Crime
and Corruption Reporting Project (https://www.occrp.org/en/) and Murray (2015,
2020) have illustrated how lawyers, accountants and corporate vehicles are used by
East European and Scottish criminals to develop their economic and social power.
Much attention has been paid to the symbolic struggle of getting lawyers to report
suspicions outside of the representation of their clients in legal matters, so the attempts
to legislate this become a goal in themselves, generating serious political conflicts in
countries such as Switzerland – rowing back reforms that were made to please the
Financial Action Task Force (2019 and 2020), and constitutional conflicts in countries
such as Canada and some European jurisdictions where the compromise is for lawyers
to report first or even only to their local Bar Associations (Levi 2020; Nougayrede
2019; Vogel and Maillart 2020). By contrast with inactivity of lawyer regulation in
many countries, in the aftermath of criticisms by FATF in its Mutual Evaluation Report
2020, the UAE suspended the license to practice of 200 law firms for a month until they
got into compliance with their systems.12 However, some might argue that this was a
largely symbolic gesture of 'show-and-tell' compliance, and many transactions of
concern are undertaken by firms that tick all the compliance boxes.
12 They failed to appoint a compliance officer, fill out a questionnaire relating to money-laundering laws or
update their data as requested. https://fincrime.report/news/2020/10/23/uae-suspends-licenses-of-200-law-
firms-for-breaching-aml-regulations/ (Accessed 25 October 2020).
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The UK situation suggests that unless there is a very marked uptick in investigative
resources, many reports from lawyers and others will not receive more than cursory
attention from financial investigators and law enforcement unless the clients are already
under suspicion, and would not have done so over the past decades (Levi and
Gelemerova 2020): this may be true elsewhere, except perhaps in jurisdictions such
as Switzerland where more pre-reporting vetting occurs.13 In 2018–19, there were
478,437 Suspicious Activity Reports in the UK, including 2774 reports from indepen-
dent legal professionals, though data on how many firms report (or do not report)
suspicions are secret, and such data are anonymous, highly classified and relate to
individual reports and sectors unless they are escalated in rare cases to the UK public-
private partnership – the Joint Money Laundering Intelligence Task Force, On the other
hand, at a normative level, imposing on lawyers an obligation to consider the legality
(even to some, legitimacy) of sources of funds and wealth, and the rationale for the
legal constructions they put into effect does not seem in principle to be wrong. If no-
one other than the lawyer knows about it and the client is able to do what s/he wishes or
find another more willing professional if one turns them down, this is little deterrence
or prevention. The extension of overseas tax evasion and corruption as a predicate
offence is a potential game changer in the volume of crimes that touch upon the work of
the transaction lawyer, which is one reason for the resistance in the US and some other
legal professions to onerous Customer Due Diligence rules.
However, no jurisdiction (or the Financial Action Task Force or the European Union
collectively) has grappled seriously with the problem of how to judge effectiveness in
the regulation of enablers, beyond the massive reduction in ‘crime’ that has not
yet happened and which, if serious organised crime did fall (with whatever measure-
ment disputes there might be), they might then make a heuristic ‘causal’ connection to
‘denial of laundering opportunities’. In the absence of a ‘solution’ to the effectiveness
of lawyer regulation, there has been a focus on the number of SARs by lawyers and on
prosecutions/regulatory interventions against lawyers which, in the eyes of NGOs
fighting kleptocracy and the FATF, is never ‘enough’. Like bankers, lawyers are
unpopular and especially at times of high social inequality and economic crisis, they
make good targets for folk devilment, and there is no reason to think that the struggle
for expansion of the rules to include the legal profession will cease any year soon.
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